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Achieving the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) remains an important global challenge. 
Better protection for the poor against health 
shocks is crucial in this endeavour and interna-
tional organizations, such as the ILO and the 
WHO, have advanced micro or community-
based health-insurance (CBHI) schemes as an 
appropriate instrument. It is argued that these 
schemes can improve access to health care, 
reduce the costs of medical treatment and 
lessen the need to use costly strategies to pay 
for medical expenditures. As such, health insur-
ance or CBHI schemes should be an integral 
element in poverty-reduction strategies.  
 
Can health insurance schemes live up to these 
expectations? Do insured households have 
lower expenditures on health? Do they use 
other means to cover their medical costs, such 
as loans or the sale of assets, less frequently? 
And if they use such strategies to meet expen- 
 
 
ditures, do they sell less costly assets or do they 
take out smaller loans compared to non-insured 
households? The findings presented here are 
based on a survey conducted in Uganda in 
2006 in collaboration with the health-insurance 
provider Microcare Ltd. The sample covered in-
sured and uninsured households in five rural 
communities in Kisiizi District and two urban 
communities in Kampala, where Microcare op-
erates. 
 
Micro-insurance is a term that is often used to 
describe the risk-pooling instruments de-
signed for low-income people with a relatively 
low capacity to pay for insurance. In the last 
few decades, several types of micro-insurance 
have been designed, such as life insurance, 
crop insurance, health insurance, credit insur-
ance, etc. There are four ways to deliver mi-
cro-insurance to the public. The Community-
Based or Mutual Model is designed and man-
aged by the clients themselves. In the Part-
ner-Agent Model, an insurance company links 
up with an NGO to deliver and market the in-
surance policy, while in the Full Service 
Model, all the activities are in the hands of the 
micro-insurance company. In a Provider-
Driven model a (health-care) provider runs the 
insurance scheme and is responsible for all 
operations. Microcare operates according to 
the Partner-Agent Model. 
 
Illness: consequences and protection 
Poor people in developing countries are fre-
quently confronted with illness. Formal social 
protection, either through state social-security 
programmes or market-based insurance, is of-
ten lacking and many families are not protected 
against the consequences of illness. Apart from 
the need to care for a patient, illness is likely to 
reduce a household’s income if people are not 
able to work. Illness may also involve extra ex-
penditures to cover the costs of treatment. As it 
is common for patients and their families to lack 
the cash needed for medical fees, people may 
forego treatment, with potentially detrimental 
effects for their long-term health. Alternatively, 
some families use costly strategies to pay for 
medical care: they reduce spending on basic 
needs such as food, sell household or produc-
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tive assets or borrow money. Such strategies 
may endanger the future economic status of the 
household as people become indebted, deplete 
their savings or reduce their future income-gen-
erating capacity by selling productive assets 
such as cattle or agricultural tools. This, in re-
turn, will increase their risk of ending up or be-
ing trapped in poverty.  
In this context, protection against high medi-
cal costs through health insurance allows earlier 
medical treatment, which is likely to shorten the 
duration of an illness, reduce the number of 
workdays lost and improve productivity at work 
because of better health. More indirectly, when 
households are better protected against high 
medical costs, they are less likely to have to rely 
on other strategies to finance medical expendi-
tures and are more likely to be able to accumu-
late savings and assets.  
Policy debates have placed a great deal of 
emphasis on the development of health-insur-
ance products for the poor. Following the micro-
credit boom, micro-insurance is being advanced 
as a successful method of improving poor peo-
ple’s lives and in the past two decades, hun-
dreds of small schemes have been imple-
mented across the globe. However, empirical 
evidence on the effects of health insurance is 
still limited. 
 
 
 
Microcare in Uganda 
Health insurance is thought to reduce out-of-
pocket (OOP) expenditures on health. Out-of-
pocket expenditures include the total costs of a 
consultation and treatment, including transport 
costs and insurance premiums (for those in-
sured). In the communities where Microcare 
operates, insured households pay, on average, 
lower medical expenditures. Figure 1 shows 
that, on average, annual medical expenditures 
for insured households are Ush 103,220 (US$ 
55.79) lower compared to households without 
insurance. If the number of illnesses a house- 
hold experiences in a year is taken into account, 
 
Microcare provides health insurance to groups 
of households in the so-called informal sector, 
such as self-employed farmers. These groups 
are usually well established, such as credit 
groups or farmers’ associations, or are groups 
that have organized themselves specifically to 
access insurance. Participation rates in Micro-
care’s informal-sector health-insurance 
scheme are approximately 15% of the popula-
tion in Kisiizi but less than 1% in Kampala.  
The health-insurance package offered covers 
outpatient and inpatient services but excludes 
medication for chronic illnesses such as HIV/-
AIDS, hypertension and diabetes. Premiums 
have to be paid as an annual lump sum, are 
non-refundable and vary according to a 
household’s size and location. At the time of 
this study, the annual premium in Kampala 
was USh 149,000 (US$ 80.54) for a family of 
four, with additional premiums for extra mem-
bers: USh 52,000 (US$ 28.11) for each extra 
adult and USh 26,000 (US$ 14.05) for an ex-
tra child. The Kisiizi scheme charged annual 
premiums starting at USh 24,000 (US$ 12.97) 
for a family of four while a family of eight paid 
USh 32,000 (US$17.29) per year and a family 
of up to twelve members USh 40,000 (US$ 
21.62). On average, this amounts to between 
1% and 2% of a household’s annual expendi-
ture. 
 
the difference amounts to Ush 28,770 (US$ 
15.55) per illness. As these expenditures in-
clude insurance premiums, the results show that 
having access to Microcare’s health-insurance 
scheme reduces total medical expenditures 
considerably.  
Similar findings have been reported in stud-
ies on health-insurance schemes in Senegal, 
India and Vietnam. The innovative element in 
this Ugandan study is the inclusion of the rela-
tionship between health insurance and other 
strategies to finance medical expenditures, such 
as acquiring informal loans or selling assets. 
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Figure 1 
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Value of loans and assets sales for OOP expenditures 
(in Ush per illness)
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Figure 2 
 
The Ugandan data show that insured and 
uninsured households acquire loans to the 
same extent to cover medical expenditures. 
However, insured households on average bor-
row smaller amounts per reported illness. Figure 
2 shows that the difference is more than Ush 
35,000 (US$ 18.92), indicating that insured 
households are less heavily indebted than unin-
sured households. At the same time, insured 
households are less likely to sell assets and if 
they do, the value of the assets sold per illness 
is lower – some Ush 5,000 (US$ 2.70) per ill-
ness. These findings suggest that insured 
households are better protected against health 
shocks and less often resort to coping strategies 
that could endanger their future well-being. 
Although insured households use other stra-
tegies less often to finance medical expendi-
tures, there are two reasons why health insur-
ance is unlikely to make these other strategies 
completely redundant. First, Microcare’s insur-
ance policy covers a limited number of costs 
and excludes, for example, medication for 
chronic illnesses that may confront insured 
households with high recurring costs. This can  
 
 
Microcare meeting in Kamoobwa 
 
be especially taxing for households with patients 
suffering from AIDS, hypertension or diabetes. 
In addition, health-care providers ask user fees 
for outpatient visits and admissions from both 
insured and uninsured patients. And patients 
may have to spend a considerable amount of 
money on transport to a medical facility and 
these costs are not covered by the policy either. 
Such expenditures may force households to 
borrow money or sell assets as many house-
holds are strapped for cash, especially in rural 
areas. 
These additional costs are common in small-
scale insurance schemes and are necessary to 
prevent insured members from behaving in a 
riskier manner because they are insured (moral 
hazard). Such costs are also related to the na-
ture of the schemes: low costs insurance for a 
relatively small group. As the number of mem-
bers is restricted, the associated pool to share 
the health risks is equally restricted, which limits 
the costs to be covered by the policy. This could 
in theory be solved by increasing the premium 
of the insurance, but that is not an option in 
schemes targeted at the poor. 
 
Insured households can still be confronted 
with substantial health-related costs, for ex-
ample, for medicines for chronic illnesses. 
Insured households in the rural areas paid 
more than USh 54,000 (US$ 29.19) per 
chronic illness, while insured households in 
urban areas reported twice this amount; USh 
108,900 (US$ 58.86). Additionally, health-care 
providers ask uninsured and insured patients 
to pay user fees for both outpatient (OPD) and 
inpatient (IPD) departments. An OPD visit to 
Kisiizi Hospital was USh 1,000 (US$ 0.54) for 
the insured and USh 1,200 (US$ 0.65) for the 
uninsured, while admission costs USh 5,000 
(US$ 2.70) for everyone. An OPD visit in 
Kampala varied from between USh 2,500 
(US$ 1.35) and USh 5,000 (US$ 2.70). Trans-
port costs can also be high in cases of severe 
or repeated illnesses or if it is a long way to 
the nearest health-care facility, as is often the 
case in rural areas. Transport costs in and 
around Kisiizi amounted to about 31% of total 
OOP expenditures for medical care, ranging 
from 53% in one community to close to zero in 
another. In urban neighbourhoods, house-
holds allocated on average 18% of their total 
OOP health-care expenditures to transport 
costs. 
 
A second reason why other strategies to fi-
nance medical expenditures are not being made 
redundant by health insurance is that numerous 
respondents reported difficulties in paying their 
premium and borrowed money or sold assets to 
be able to do so. Information from the survey 
shows that only 37% of insured household 
heads could pay their premiums from available 
cash sources. More than half of the insured 
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household heads (55%) borrowed money to pay 
their premiums, while the remaining 8% sold 
assets. Among the insured respondents who 
borrowed money, over 82% borrowed from 
members of their community. Others, especially 
those in urban areas, used a micro-credit loan 
from FINCA Uganda to pay the premium.  
Although these examples demonstrate that 
health insurance cannot offer households full 
protection against the financial effects of health 
risks, the lower incidence of asset sales, the 
lower value of asset sales and the smaller sums 
borrowed by insured respondents are encour-
aging. Health insurance potentially has a con-
tribution to make beyond reducing medical ex-
penditures and improving access to health care. 
With lower levels of indebtedness and asset 
depletion, health insurance can improve house-
holds’ well-being more generally.  
Kisiizi hospital 
 
Lessons learnt 
The study focused on the direct and indirect 
effects of Microcare’s health-insurance scheme 
(i.e. its effect on medical expenditures and 
strategies to finance these expenditures), and 
found a positive association between the 
scheme and these indicators. Three practical 
recommendations can be offered as a result of 
this study. The limited availability of cash in 
households, especially in rural areas, may trig-
ger informal loans and asset sales to finance 
the payment of premiums, transport costs or co-
payments for consultations and treatment. To 
minimize informal loans and asset sales, it is 
therefore recommended that (1) micro-insur-
ance schemes are restricted in charging co-
payments beyond the level required to prevent 
moral hazard, (2) design tailor-made premium 
payment schedules that coincide with house-
holds’ cash availability and (3) operate in con-
junction with a micro-finance institution to facili-
tate the payment of premiums and/or encourage 
savings to cover future payments. The precise 
possibilities to implement these recommenda-
tions should be assessed in the context of the 
scheme(s) under consideration. 
 
Town around Kisiizi 
 
The results presented here are based on one 
case study and limited to Microcare’s insurance 
schemes in Kampala and Kisiizi. These may not 
be representative of members across Uganda 
or of other schemes. To ascertain if the relation-
ship between health insurance, medical expen-
ditures and strategies to finance medical costs 
is to be found more generally, the African Stud-
ies Centre has started a research project that 
addresses similar questions in micro-health in-
surance schemes in other African countries. 
Currently, we are working for example in Togo 
to study the impact of CBHI on the welfare of 
households, and in particular their children’s 
health. 
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